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COMMENTS
Grey Market Imports: A Genuine Problem
for the United States Trademark Owner,
Customs Service, and Courts
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year billions of dollars worth of goods1 are produced by for-
eign manufacturers and legitimately sold abroad under a particular
trademark and are then imported into the United States and sold without
permission from the foreign manufacturers or the authorized United
States distributors2 of these goods.3 When imported into this country,
these foreign goods are sold in competition* with goods of the owners of
the United States trademark rights in the identical foreign marks. Such
goods have come to be known as "grey market" imports.5 These goods
are not counterfeit products, which are often called "black market"
goods; rather, they are genuine goods which bear authentic trademarks.
I It has been estimated that the total value of the market in these goods may be as much as $10
billion annually. See Riley, 'Gray Market'Fight Isn't Black and White, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at
1, col.3.
2 Often a foreign manufacturer appoints an exclusive distributor of its goods in the United
States. The foreign manufacturer usually assigns or otherwise transfers its trademark rights in those
goods to the United States distributor.
3 Merchandise such as watches, electronic equipment, cameras, batteries, fragrances,
automobiles, and wines, are a few examples of unauthorized genuine imports. See Riley, supra note
1, at I.
4 The third party importer may be able to take advantage of international currency fluctuation
and buy large amounts of the foreign manufacturer's goods, import them into the United States, and
sell them at a price lower than the price at which the authorized United States distributor is able to
sell them.
5 The importation by the unauthorized third party is also called "'parallel importation" when
the goods are bein'g imported alongside the goods of an authorized United States distributor. See
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792
F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Jan. 6, 1987) (No. 86-757).
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The unauthorized importation of grey market goods is a widespread
practice and is viewed as a grave problem for many United States trade-
mark owners.
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 19307 ("§ 526") deals with the im-
portation of goods bearing trademarks identical to a trademark regis-
tered in the United States. Section 526 read literally prohibits the entry
of all grey market goods into the United States unless the domestic trade-
mark owner gives written consent to the importation.8 In order to imple-
ment § 526, however, the United States Customs Service ("Customs
Service" or "Customs") has adopted regulations which provide to the
domestic trademark owner less protection from the importation of grey
market goods than does the literal language of § 526.1 These regulations
allow third parties to import identically trademarked goods when "the
foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or
control .. ". ,,'o Naturally, United States trademark holders have been
largely dissatisfied with the limited protection afforded by the regulations
and in recent years have challenged their interpretation of § 526 as being
invalid. 11
These challenges have led to conflicting decisions among the Circuit
Courts of Appeals as to the validity of the Customs regulations. Until
there is a resolution of this conflict either by a statement from Congress
in the form of legislation or by a decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States, it is likely that the Customs Service will continue to follow
6 Some say the grey market may account in 1985 for as many as 65,000 luxury cars and one out
of every three cameras purchased in the United States through such nationwide distributors as K-
Mart Corporation and such mail order houses as New York's 47th Street Photo, Inc. Riley, supra
note 1, at 1.
7 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982) [hereinafter § 526]. This section prohibits the entry into the United
States of "any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned
by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States, and
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States .... Id.
8 Id. Section 526, however, does not generally prohibit importation of goods "accompanying
any person arriving in the United States when such articles are for his personal use and not for sale."
19 U.S.C. § 1526(d).
9 See infra note 40.
10 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1986). Common ownership is defined as "individual or aggregate
ownership of more than 50 percent of the business entity." 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)(1). Common con-
trol means "effective control in policy and operations and is not necessarily synonymous with com-
mon ownership." 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)(2).
I 1 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d 1552 (upholding the Customs regulations as a valid interpretation of
§ 526); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks [COPIAT] v. United States, 790 F.2d
903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3411 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1986) (No. 86-625) (declaring
the Customs regulations invalid); Olympus, 792 F.2d 315 (explicitly disagreeing with COPIA T and
upholding the Customs regulations as a valid interpretation of § 526).
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its regulations allowing the importation of grey market goods absent a
showing that the owner of the foreign trademark and the owner of the
domestic trademark are independent or unrelated entities.
With Customs refusing to exclude automatically all grey market
goods, domestic trademark holders have turned to the district courts for
a determination of whether the goods may be excluded and damages re-
covered pursuant to § 526(c). This section provides for private remedies
to the injured domestic trademark holder. 12 In addition to bringing suit
against grey market importers under § 526(c), the domestic trademark
holder may also allege a traditional trademark infringement cause of ac-
tion. 3 Bringing a trademark infringement action against a grey market
importer, however, has resulted in a number of problems for the domes-
tic trademark holder. Specifically, an attempt to obtain relief by alleging
trademark infringement requires the domestic trademark holder to
demonstrate that the grey market importer's use of the trademark is
likely to cause confusion. 4 Nonetheless, a showing of "likelihood of
confusion" may be difficult for the domestic trademark holder especially
in light of several decisions which may be interpreted as concluding that
confusion is not possible where the imported goods are genuine. 5
This Comment will discuss the alternatives available to a domestic
trademark owner when faced with the importation of genuine goods. Af-
ter briefly reviewing the background to the enactment of § 526 and the
subsequent judicial and regulatory interpretations of the section, this
Comment will examine those decisions which have ruled upon the valid-
ity of the Customs regulations as interpreting § 526.16 Next, this Com-
ment will consider the problems faced by domestic trademark owners
who decide to pursue their remedy by filing private suits in the district
courts.' 7 The application by these courts of several well-established
trademark principles to grey market import situations will then be re-
viewed."8 This Comment will conclude that, under the trademark princi-
ple of territoriality, "genuine goods" can cause confusion so as to be
deemed infringing. Consequently, a court should not be dissuaded from
12 See infra note 79.
13 Domestic trademark owners typically bring suit under various sections of what is popularly
known as the Lanham Act. The trademark owner may also allege a cause of action for unfair
competition under 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
14 See, e.g., § 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (1982), reprinted infra note 94.
15 See, e.g., El Greco Leather Prod. Co., Inc. v. Shoe World Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380, 1397
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1982); DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., 622 F.2d 621, 622 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980).
16 See infra notes 50-101 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 94-190 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 112-44 and accompanying text.
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this holding merely because other cases may be interpreted as expressing
doubt as to whether confusion can arise from the importation of genuine
goods. 19
II. ALTERNATIVES FOR DOMESTIC TRADEMARK OWNERS
A. Protection by Exclusion at Customs
1. Enactment of Section 526
Before 1923, courts did not extend protection to a United States
trademark owner from the importation of foreign merchandise bearing
trademarks identical to a trademark registered in the United States.2 °
The Second Circuit in A. Bourois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel2 1 followed prece-
dent by allowing the importation of such "genuine goods." In Katzel, a
French cosmetic manufacturer which was in the business of importing its
face powder bearing the trademark "Java" into the United States, sold its
business, its goodwill, and the United States trademarks to the plaintiff.22
Later, the defendant, not a party to the contract, began purchasing the
"Java" face powder from the French manufacturer and importing it into
the United States, selling it at a large profit. The plaintiff brought suit
alleging trademark infringement under Section 27 of the Trademark Act
of 1905, now Section 42 of the Lanham Act.
The plaintiff showed that it had spent large sums of money and con-
siderable effort in order to build up goodwill for the plaintiff's business in
the United States. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that a third-party importer's unauthorized use of the same
trademark on imported goods did not constitute trademark infringement
as long as the goods were genuine.2 3 As the goods sold by the defendant
accurately identified the foreign manufacturer of the product, the court
found no violation of the plaintiff's trademark rights.24
The Supreme Court of the United States eventually reversed the de-
cision of the Second Circuit.25 Before the Supreme Court decided the
issue, however, Congress enacted § 526 of the Tariff Act in response to
19 See infra notes 145-90 and accompanying text.
20 See Fred Gretcsh Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916), where the court held that
a registered United States trademark for violin strings was not infringed by one who bought in
Germany the genuine violin strings labeled with that trademark and sold them in the United States
with the mark intact. See also Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 F. 861 (2d Cir. 1922).
21 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
22 Id. at 539.
23 Id. at 543.
24 Id. at 540.
25 See A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
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the Second Circuit's ruling.26 Section 526 thus made it unlawful to im-
port into the United States any article which "bears a trademark owned
by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within the United States."
2 7
The legislative history of § 526, however, reveals that, when enact-
ing this section, Congress apparently misunderstood the issue involved in
Katzel.2s Congress erroneously believed that the situation in Katzel in-
volved a foreign manufacturer's attempt to take advantage of its assign-
ment of trademark rights to a United States company by later
capitalizing on the goodwill which had been developed painstakingly in
the United States by the United States trademark holder.29 However,
these were not the circumstances involved in the Katzel case. In Katzel
there was no importation of the trademarked goods by the foreign manu-
facturer and seller, rather there was importation by a third party unre-
lated to the transaction.3 °
2. The Customs Service's Interpretation of Section 526
In 1931, Customs issued regulations prohibiting entry into the
United States of all "imported merchandise bearing a genuine trade-
mark" which had been properly registered by the holder of the domestic
mark.31 Thus, at this time, absent the domestic trademark owner's con-
26 See Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 975 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
(1982)).
27 Id.
28 Note, Trademark Infringement: Power of an American Trademark Owner to Prevent the Im-
portation of The Authentic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Company, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 566
nn.48-5 1 (1955) (reviewing the legislative history and application of § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922,
and concluding that this section was passed specifically to protect the independent United States
trademark owner from the importation of genuine goods). See also Atwood, Import Restrictions on
Trademarked Merchandise - The Role of the United States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADEMARK
REP. 301, 304 (1969); Note, Discrimination Against Foreign Owners of U.S. Trademarks Under 19
U.S.C. § 1526, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 423, 427 (1984).
29 See 62 CONG. REC. 11,602, 11,605 (Aug. 19, 1922). Senator McCumber, in arguing for the
enactment of § 526, stated that the court in Katzel "has held that a trade-mark did not protect a
party at all against importations of the article from the very firm which sold it .... " Id.
Senator Sutherland emphasized that the scope of § 526 was to be limited to the prevention of
fraud on "American citizens who have purchased trade-marks from foreigners ... when these for-
eigners deliberately violate the property rights of those to whom they have sold these trademarks
.... It prevents, and its only aim is to prevent, a palpable fraud." Id. at 11,603.
30 See Katzel, 275 F. at 541. Shortly after § 526 became law, the Supreme Court reversed the
Second Circuit decision in Katzel without mentioning the enactment of § 526 by Congress. See
Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692. The Court held that the importation of trademarked goods from a foreign
manufacturer could be enjoined when the foreign manufacturer had sold the mark to the plaintiff,
regardless of the fact that the trademarked article was genuine.
31 Customs Regulations of 1931, art. 513(a) provides:
Prohibition of Entry - Entry is prohibited of imported merchandise bearing a genuine trade-
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sent, the regulations prohibited importation of all goods bearing a trade-
mark identical to a registered United States trademark.32 In 1936,
however, the Customs Service changed the regulations to allow for the
importation of genuine goods if the foreign trademark and the United
States trademark were "owned by the same person, partnership, associa-
tion or corporation."33 In 1953, Customs further limited the protection
it had previously afforded to United States trademark owners by ruling
that the importation of genuine goods was allowed if the foreign trade-
mark were owned by a "related company" of the United States trade-
mark owner.34 In addition, the regulations required disclosure of the
existence of such related companies.35
In 1959, Customs returned to the less-restrictive 1936 standards, ap-
parently in response to a case brought in the Southern District of New
York.36 Although Customs deleted all reference to "related companies"
mark when such trade-mark is recorded with the Treasury Department and registered under
the trade-mark law of February 20, 1905, if compliance is had with all provisions of Section 526
of the Tariff Act of 1930, provided the period of protection of such trademark has not expired.
See generally Atwood, supra note 28 (detailing the history of the Customs regulations).
32 See Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931); Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566,
33 Specifically, Customs Regulations of 1936, art. 518, as amended, states:
(a) Merchandise of foreign or domestic manufacture is prohibited importation when it bears a
name or mark which copies or simulates a trade-mark or trade name entitled to the protection
of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 or the Trade-Mark Act of 1920, unless such merchandise is
imported by or for the account of, or with the written consent of, the owner of the protected
trade-mark or trade name.
(b) A name or mark (including a name or mark which is a genuine trade-mark or trade name in
a foreign country) on an article of foreign manufacture identical with a trade-mark or trade
name protected by the trade-mark laws of the United States, as well as a name or mark on an
article of foreign or domestic manufacture counterfeiting such protected trade-mark or trade
name, or so resembling such protected trade-mark or trade name as to be likely to cause confu-
sion or mistake in the minds of the public or to deceive purchasers, shall be deemed for the
purposes of these regulations to copy or simulate such protected trade-mark or trade name.
However, merchandise manufactured or sold in a foreign country under a trade-mark or trade
name, which trade-mark is registered and recorded, or which trade name is recorded under the
trade-mark laws of the United States, shall not be deemed for the purpose of these regulations to
copy or simulate such United States trade-mark or trade name if such foreign trade-mark or
trade name and such United States trade-mark or trade name are owned by the same person,
partnership, association or corporation.
T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336, 337 (1936).
34 18 Fed. Reg. 8688 (1953) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1953)), repealed by T.D. 54,932, 94
Treas. Dec. 433 (1959). "Related company" was to be defined as in § 45 of the Lanham Act of 1946:
any person who "legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant. . . in respect to the nature
and quality of the goods or services in connection with which the mark is used." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1982).
35 18 Fed. Reg. 8688 (1953) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 11.15 (1953)), repealed by T.D. 54,932, 94
Treas. Dec. 433 (1959). Because Customs had no knowledge of the existence of such relationships
before this disclosure requirement, those trademark owners who had recorded with Customs before
1953 were able to continue to exclude goods bearing an identical trademark which originated from a
"related" foreign supplier. Atwood, supra note 28, at 310.
36 In United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. juris noted, 355
U.S. 937, vacated and remanded, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
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from the regulations, protection from the importation of genuine goods
continued to be denied where the same entity owned the foreign and the
United States trademarks.37
The Customs Service revised the regulations, once again, in 1972.38
The new provisions allowed the importation of foreign-made goods bear-
ing trademarks identical to registered United States marks if both the
foreign and United States trademark owners were parent/subsidiary cor-
porations or companies otherwise subject to common ownership and
control or when the goods were imported by foreign manufacturers au-
thorized to use the mark by the United States trademark owner.39 The
1972 regulations basically have remained unchanged and are still in
force.40
3. Recent Challenges to Customs Regulations
Recently the Customs regulations have been criticized by two fed-
eral courts41 and actually invalidated by a third.42 In Bell & Howell:
the government brought suit against a United States distributor of French perfume alleging that the
distributor had created an illegal monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act by using the exclusion-
ary provisions of § 526 to prevent others from importing the French perfume bearing the United
States distributor's trademark. The government argued that the protection afforded to United States
trademark owners should not be given to the owner of the trademark in this case because the owner
of the United States mark was part of a single international business enterprise with a foreign com-
pany. The court agreed with the position taken by the government holding that § 526 may only give
advantage to a United States trademark owner who was independent from the foreign owner of the
mark. Id. at 80.
Despite its victory in the district court, the government moved to vacate the judgment so that it
could move to dismiss the case. The government explained its action by stating that it was the
practice of Customs to allow exclusions of genuine goods in this type of situation and that it would
seek legislation which would provide for the limiting of the protection of § 526 to United States
companies which were independent of the foreign manufacturers of the goods which it imported.
This legislation, however, was never enacted. See Bicks, Antitrust and Trademark Protection Con-
cepts in the Import Field, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 1255, 1259 (1959). See also Atwood, supra note 28,
at 307.
37 See Atwood, supra note 28, at 310.
38 T.D. 72-266, 6 Cust. B. & Dec. 433 (1972).
39 Id.
40 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986), in relevant part, provides:
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with one owned
and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or association created or organ-
ized within the United States are subject to seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same person or busi-
ness entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary com-
panies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control... ;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under
authorization of the U.S. owner ....
41 See Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
Grey Market Imports
7:762(1986)
Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co.,43 the plaintiff was a United States com-
pany which owned the United States trademark rights in foreign-made
photographic equipment and was the exclusive importer and distributor
of these goods in the United States. The plaintiff sought an injunction
against the defendant which imported genuine cameras bearing the plain-
tiff's trademark which the defendant had acquired in the country of for-
eign manufacture.' The district court, issuing an injunction, found that
the regulations did not allow the importation of the grey market goods in
this particular case because there was no common ownership or common
control as defined in the regulations.45 More important, however, the
court expressed doubt as to the validity of the regulations by noting that
"the variance between the literal language of [§ 526] and the current in-
terpretations adopted by the Customs Service has prompted more than
one commentator to question whether the regulations implementing the
statute are ultra vires."
46
Similarly, in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,4 7 the plaintiff, a United
States trademark owner, sought to enjoin the defendant from importing
goods of the same manufacture and bearing the identical trademark.
Upon examination of § 526, the court questioned whether the Customs
Service exceeded its authority in promulgating the regulations.48 The
court also questioned the wisdom and necessity for the regulations and
stated that they represented an effort on the part of Customs to imple-
ment its perception of antitrust policy without authority from
Congress.49
The most recent and serious blow to the Customs regulations oc-
curred in the decision rendered by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks [COPIAT] v. United States.5" This decision re-
vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163
(S.D.N.Y 1984).
42 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903.
43 548 F. Supp. 1063.
44 Id. at 1065.
45 Id. at 1079.
46 Id. (citing Kuhn, Remedies Available at Customs for Infringement of a Registered Trademark,
70 TRADEMARK REP. 387, 388 (1981) and Derenberg, Current Trademark Problems in Foreign
Travel and the Import Trade, 39 TRADEMARK REP. 674, 705 n.80 (1959)).
47 589 F. Supp. 1163. This was the second time the plaintiff brought suit for an injunction
against grey market importers, the first suit being decided against the plaintiff in Bell & Howell, 719
F.2d 42. Sometime after the Bell & Howell case, the plaintiff changed its name from Bell & Howell:
Mamiya Co. to Osawa & Co.
48 Id. at 1177.
49 Id.
50 790 F.2d at 904.
769
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versed a district court ruling which upheld the Customs regulations as an
interpretation fully consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting
§ 526 and a reflection of the Customs Service's "long standing and con-
sistent" interpretation of the section." In the COPIAT case, United
States companies sought a mandatory order directing the Customs Ser-
vice to exclude grey market imports from entry into the United States.
The plaintiffs maintained that § 526 of the Tariff Act gave them an un-
qualified right to such an exclusion and that the Customs Service regula-
tions implementing § 526 were inconsistent with the Act because the
regulations allowed the importation of genuine goods manufactured by
the trademark owners' foreign subsidiaries or licensees but imported by
unrelated third parties.1
2
The Court of Appeals held that the Customs regulations are invalid
on two alternative grounds.53 First, the court expressly disagreed with
the district court's conclusion that the Customs regulations must be up-
held as "a reasonable interpretation of the statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement.", 54 The court stated that the lower court misappre-
hended the doctrine of deference to an agency's interpretation of its gov-
erning statute.55 The court emphasized that before the doctrine of
deference to agency interpretation becomes operative it must be apparent
that Congress has not already addressed the question at issue. 6  A
court, therefore, must first exercise its independent judgment on the
question of whether the statute "unambiguously expresses congressional
intention on the matter at issue.",57 If the statute expresses clear congres-
sional intent, then the court must give effect to that intent regardless of
the current interpretation given to the statute by an agency. 8
The court examined the language, purpose, legislative history, and
the various contemporaneous interpretations of the statute and con-
cluded that § 526 should not be limited in its protection by the Customs
regulations. 59 The court found that Congress clearly stated its intent in
51 See COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 852 (D.D.C. 1984). To support its conclu-
sion, the district court stated that in 1978 Congress specifically noted the practice at Customs of
allowing such importations and decided not to change this practice while, at the same time, changing
other parts of § 526. Thus, the court concluded, "Congress must be deemed to have approved the
interpretation and practice under Section 526." Id.
52 790 F.2d at 904.
53 Id. at 908.
54 Id.
55 Id.




59 id. at 913.
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§ 526, Congress defined the relevant statutory terms of that section, and
Congress did not delegate authority to the Customs Service "to adjust
the scope of the statute in response to its perceptions of changing eco-
nomic circumstance.",60 The court stated that, in 1930, § 526 applied to
all situations within its terms and concluded that the statute's meaning in
1930 is the meaning it should be given in 1986.61
The court's second basis for invalidating the Customs regulations
was that the regulations did not represent a reasonable interpretation of
§ 526.62 Indeed, the court found that the Customs Service interpretation
of § 526 did not display "the necessary 'thoroughness, validity and con-
sistency' to merit judicial acceptance.", 63 The court based this conclusion
on a number of factors. First, the court noted that the Customs Service
did not adopt its interpretation at the same time Congress enacted
§ 526.6" In fact, the first set of Customs regulations announcing the pres-
ent interpretation implemented another statute - § 27 of the Trademark
Act of 1905 - not § 526 of the Tariff Act.65 Second, the court that
found the Customs interpretation supported by vacillating reasoning. In
particular, the court found that, since the 1950s, the Custom Service's
interpretation has been motivated largely by antitrust concerns raised by
a multinational corporation's use of a United States subsidiary to stop
competition in the distribution of products bearing its trademark.66
The appellate court rejected the district court's conclusion that the
history behind the regulations evidences " 'a pattern of legislative acqui-
escence... indicat[ing] acceptance by Congress of the Customs Service's
interpretation of Section 526 .... "67 By disapproving of this statement
and its underlying reasoning, the Court of Appeals stated that unsuccess-
ful efforts to replace or modify § 526 would, in fact, suggest the contrary:
that Congress rejected a narrow view of the section's scope. 68 These con-
clusions led the court to denounce the Customs regulations as contrary
to § 526 and, therefore, unlawful.69
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 917.
63 Id. at 916 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm'n.,
454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981)).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 917.
67 Id.
68 Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
69 Id. at 918.
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4. Valid Customs Regulations: The Vivitar and Olympus Decisions
Despite criticisms by courts and commentators,70 two courts, when
faced directly with the question of the validity of the Customs regula-
tions, have declined to declare them invalid. 71 In Vivitar Corp. v. United
States7" the court addressed many of the criticisms of the Customs regu-
lations and agreed with a number of them. Nevertheless, the court de-
clined to invalidate the regulations.
The court in Vivitar first rejected the argument that Congress in-
tended to limit § 526 to bar the importation of genuine goods only in
cases where the facts are similar to those in Katzel or where there actu-
ally existed a technical trademark infringement.73 Instead, the court
concluded that "no limitations based on indications of Congressional in-
tent at the time of the enactment can be read into the statute itself."
74
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the argument that the current
Customs regulations reflect "a long standing administrative interpreta-
tion" of § 526." 5 After reviewing the series of regulations issued by Cus-
toms between 1923 and 1972,76 the court concluded that Customs has
had "continuing questions concerning the reading of the statute" and
that, over the years, Customs has "adjusted its regulations to reflect the
few judicial decisions which interpreted the law."'77 The court also re-
jected the argument that Congress accepted the regulations through a
pattern of legislative acquiescence, stating: "Legislation by total silence is
too tenuous a theory to merit extended discussion. "78
Despite these conclusions, the court held the regulations valid.
Nonetheless, the court emphasized that the Customs Service's decision
70 See Bicks, supra note 36; Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination, and the Bureau of Customs,
57 TRADEMARK REP. 14 (1967). These commentators argue that exclusion of genuine goods
through the Customs regulations gives the domestic trademark owner an unwarranted exemption
from the antitrust laws.
71 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d 1552; Olympus, 792 F.2d 315.
72 761 F.2d at 1552. In this case, the plaintiff was in the business of selling photographic equip-
ment in the United States and abroad. Id. at 1556. The products which the plaintiff sold and distrib-
uted were manufactured primarily by Japanese manufacturers. The plaintiff had established a
network of independent authorized dealerships in the United States which bought the equipment
from the plaintiff for resale to the public. The same products bearing the plaintiff's authentic trade-
mark, "Vivitar," were purchased abroad by third parties who imported them into the United States
and sold them through discount outlets. Id.
73 Id. at 1565.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 For a brief summary of the Customs regulations, see supro notes 31-40 and accompanying
text.




not to exclude automatically all grey market goods does not prevent a
trademark owner from subsequently pursuing private remedies available
under § 526(C) 79 against the importer and, if successful, having the goods
excluded. 8' The Customs regulations, therefore, are not to be considered
controlling interpretations of the scope of protection provided by § 526.8"
Rather, the regulations only define the role of Customs in initiating the
administrative enforcement of § 526.82 Where protection under the stat-
ute is "unclear or depends upon the resolution of complex factual situa-
tions, Customs may decline to impose sua sponte the extreme sanction of
exclusion" and may leave such cases for determination by the district
courts.83 The court reasoned that, just because the Customs regulations
do not provide for an initial exclusion in a particular case in which the
domestic trademark owner eventually prevails in a private action
brought in district court, does not mean that the regulations must be
declared invalid. 4
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Olym-
pus Corporation v. United States85 upheld the validity of the Customs
regulations in the face of a challenge by a United States subsidiary of a
foreign manufacturer of identically trademarked goods.86 In doing so,
the court explicitly disagreed with the Federal Circuit's conclusion in
Vivitar that the regulations have not been sufficiently consistent through-
out the years to warrant a finding of "long-standing administrative inter-
pretation" of the statute.8 7 The court in Olympus, like the district court
in COPIAT. pointed out that, since 1951, the Customs Service has issued
letters reflecting a consistent policy of allowing importation by any third
party of trademarked goods introduced into commerce by the foreign
trademark owner if the United States trademark owner and the owner of
79 This section provides that any person dealing in merchandise bearing a registered United
States trademark: "may be enjoined from dealing therein within the United States or may be re-
quired to export or destroy such merchandise or to remove or obliterate such trademark and shall be
liable for the same damages and profits provided for wrongful use of a trademark. ... Under
particular named sections of the Lanham Act. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(c). The court in Vivitar held that a
domestic trademark owner may bring suit under this section in district court despite a finding at
Customs that the identically marked goods imported by a third party should not be excluded. See
Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. Accord Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320.
80 761 F.2d at 1570.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1569.
83 Id. at 1570.
84 Id.
85 792 F.2d 315.
86 Id. As in the typical grey market scenario, the United States subsidiary was the exclusive
distributor for its Japanese parent corporation in the United States and it owned the United States
trademark in the goods it distributed.
87 Id. at 319.
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the foreign rights in the trademark are the same.8  Furthermore, the
court in Olympus concluded that Congress' failure to act by altering Cus-
toms' approach evidences Congress' acceptance of Customs Service prac-
tice.8 9 The court concluded that, "in light of the long acceptance of the
regulations, change is a matter for the legislative or executive branch and
not the judiciary."9
In arriving at this conclusion, the court specifically addressed the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in COPIAT.9' The Olympus court expressly disagreed with the
court's conclusion in COPIA T that the Customs Service's interpretation
of § 526 "does not display the necessary 'thoroughness, validity and con-
sistency to merit judicial acceptance.' "92 Moreover, like the court in
Vivitar, the court in Olympus concluded that the Customs Service's inter-
pretation of § 526 does not define the limits of protection given by the
section but merely limits the Customs Service's duty to enforce the sec-
tion by excluding all grey market imports.93
B. Private Actions
With the Courts of Appeals for the Federal and Second Circuits
upholding the validity of the Customs regulations, domestic trademark
owners unable to have grey market goods excluded by Customs will seek
relief in private suits brought in the district courts. These cases often
allege that the importation of genuine goods have infringed the domestic
trademark owner's rights in the identically marked goods.94 The funda-
88 Id. (citing Customs Service Letters dated Mar. 23, 1951, July 2, 1962, Mar. 19, 1963, Dec. 11,
1968, and June 28, 1971).
89 Id. at 320. The court noted that Congress was aware that the Customs Service permitted the
importation of many grey market goods in 1954 when it considered amending the customs laws and
even noted the practice in 1978 while amending other parts of § 526 but chose not to address the
issue or alter the practice by Customs. Id. at 320-21.
90 Id. at 321.
91 Id. at 321 n.1.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 320.
94 A statute under which a United States trademark owner often seeks relief for trademark in-
fringement is § 32(l)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a). This section provides that anyone who uses in
commerce:
any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered trademark in connec-
tion with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertisement of any goods ... which such
use is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a civil
action by the registrant ....
It should be noted that this section as well as § 42 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1124, extends
protection to the domestic trademark holder from use of a trademark which "copies" or -simulates"
the registered domestic trademark. Reading these sections literally, it appears as though they do not
apply to situations which involve the importation of genuine goods bearing the manufacturer's genu-
ine trademark. In Katzel, however, the Supreme Court held that the importation of genuine goods
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mental issue in any trademark infringement suit is that of consumer con-
fusion.95 Thus, the domestic trademark owner bringing an action for
trademark infringement is required to demonstrate that the defendant
grey market importer's use of the identical mark is likely to cause confu-
sion. In defending their cases, importers of grey market goods have often
argued that the importation and sale of genuine goods cannot be consid-
ered a trademark infringement since the importation of such goods can-
not possibly cause confusion.96 On the other hand, plaintiff domestic
trademark holders contend that the importation of these goods may
cause confusion regardless of the genuineness of the articles.97
Some cases addressing this issue have been read as expressions of
uncertainty as to whether imports may be infringing if they cause or are
likely to cause consumer confusion, mistake, or deception.9" Through
the application of the trademark principle of territoriality,99 other courts
have found that genuine goods may indeed cause consumer confusion.100
The remainder of this Comment will review the application of the princi-
may be held a trademark infringement under § 27 (now § 42 of the Lanham Act) and could be
barred from importation despite the statute's language of "copy" or "simulate." The court followed
the trademark theory of "territoriality" which states that the function of a trademark is to identify
the source which stands behind the goods sold under the trademark, that is, the United States trade-
mark holder distributing the goods in the United States, and not necessarily the foreign manufac-
turer. A third party importer selling the goods under the same trademark would infringe the United
States trademark owner's rights because the public would attribute such goods to the United States
markholder.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in A. Bourgois & Co., Inc. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923),
following the Katzel decision, found that a third party's importation of genuine goods constituted an
infringement of a domestic trademark owner's rights in the trademark despite the fact that the goods
involved were genuine and were obtained from the same manufacturer. Recent courts have followed
these early decisions and have recognized that an action may lie against importers of genuine goods
under §§ 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act despite their language of "copy" or "simulate." See Weil
Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985). But see Olympus, 792 F.2d at 321
(stating in dictum that § 42 of the Lanham Act does not apply to bar importation of genuine goods
but only to bar importation of goods which "copy" or "simulate" trademarked goods).
A domestic trademark owner may also allege a cause of action for unfair competition under
§ 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
95 See I J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:6 (2d ed. 1984), for the
proposition that:
Trademark law has many presumptions, assumptions and a few overriding public policies, but
the central key is consumer perception. Analogies to other forms of "property" from real estate
to patents and copyrights falter on the basic definition of ... trademark "property .... The
property in a trademark is the right to prevent confusion.
96 See, e.g., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1163; Well, 618 F. Supp. 700.
97 Id.
98 See Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d 1054; El Greco, 599 F. Supp. 1380; DEP, 622 F.2d 621; Bell &
Howell, 719 F.2d 42.
99 2 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS 1340 (1975). See infra notes
102-08 and accompanying text for a discussion on the principle of territoriality.
100 See Katzel, 260 U.S. 689: Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1163; Well, 618 F. Supp. 700.
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ple of territoriality by the courts. The Comment will argue that the use
of this principle to find that genuine goods can cause confusion should
not be questioned seriously despite those decisions which have been inter-
preted as concluding otherwise.' 0'
1. The Principles of Territoriality and Universality
According to the principle of territoriality, the protection which a
trademark receives in a particular country is determined by the law of
that country. ' 0 2 Thus a trademark may have a separate legal existence in
each country in which it is used."0 3 The principle of territoriality also
recognizes that a trademark does not merely specify the source of origin
of the product it marks.'04 Rather, a primary function of a trademark is
to symbolize the local goodwill of the trademark owner whose reputation
backs the particular product in that specific locale.'0 5 In other words,
the territoriality principle recognizes that trademark rights are created to
maintain and protect a trademark owner's established goodwill and that
marks which are identical are not necessarily the same trademarks in
law. '
06
The application of this principle is particularly important. An im-
porter of goods manufactured in a foreign country may own trademark
rights in the goods it imports so long as there has been an assignment or
transfer to the importer of the manufacturer's trademark rights in the
United States and an agreement that the trademark may be registered by
the importer.10 7 Thus, the importation and sale of genuine goods in the
United States by the foreign manufacturer or other third party would be
considered infringing under the principle of territoriality if the importa-
tion confused the public and led them to believe that the owner of the
identical domestic trademark stood behind the imported product. 08
In contrast, under the trademark principle of universality, the im-
portation into the United States of goods manufactured abroad under a
101 See infra notes 145-90 and accompanying text.
102 Beir, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, I INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW [II] 48, 59 (W. Ger. 1970); S. LADAS, supra
note 99.
103 Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and Goodwill, 47 VA. L. REV. 733, 734
(1961); Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 705.
104 Well, 618 F. Supp. at 705; see Derenberg, supra note 103, at 736.
105 See Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 705. See generally 3 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE-
MARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 17.01-.04 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing the various functions which a
trademark performs).
106 See Katzel, 260 U.S. at 700.




particular trademark would not infringe the rights of the owner of the
identical mark in the United States. The principle of universality states
that trademark rights are an extension of a personality right; this right is
considered to be so closely associated with the first user of the mark that
the trademark is entitled to universal protection beyond the boundaries
of the originating country. 0 9 As long as the trademark is lawfully af-
fixed to a product in a foreign country, the product will lawfully bear
that mark everywhere it goes and will not be infringed if imported into a
country where another party holds the exclusive right to use the mark. 110
Furthermore, as the imported goods are genuine and are marked to iden-
tify their "source of origin" (i.e., their foreign manufacturer), the impor-
tation of these goods into the territory of the United States trademark
owner could not possibly deceive or confuse the public. "' Hence, absent
the ability of these goods to cause confusion, it would be impossible for
the importation of genuine goods to constitute a trademark infringement.
2. Application of the Principles
An early decision allowing grey market importation based on the
universality principle was Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer. I 2 In this case, the
plaintiff had acquired from a Hungarian manufacturer the sole distribu-
torship right as well as the United States trademark on "Hunyadi Janos,"
a special brand of mineral water.' " The defendant, however, began im-
porting genuine "Hunyadi Janos" water into the United States after
purchasing it in the Federal Republic of Germany. Applying the univer-
sality principle, the court found that the defendant grey market importer
did not infringe the plaintiff's trademark rights because the defendant
was importing and selling genuine goods which could not cause public
confusion as to the source of the product's origin.
114
This view of grey market imports with regard to trademark law
changed shortly after the Apollonaris decision with the case of Katzel "1
where the court applied the principle of territoriality in lieu of the univer-
sality principle. The district court held that the defendant had infringed
the plaintiff's trademark rights by selling certain cosmetic articles bear-
ing the mark "Java" in the territory where the plaintiff had established
109 Derenberg, supra note 103, at 734.
110 Id. See also Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 705.
111 R. CALLMAN, supra note 105, § 21.17.
112 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
113 Id. at 19.
114 Id. at 21.
15 274 F. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). See supra note 21-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the facts of the Katzel case.
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itself as the exclusive owner of the trademark.' 1 6 The Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's decision, however, holding that, since the de-
fendant's goods were genuine "Java" products, there could be no public
confusion and, therefore, no trademark infringement.
1 17
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's decision and re-
versed the Court of Appeals, recognizing that a trademark infringement
action could lie against an importer of genuine goods.118 The court
found that even though both the plaintiff's and defendant's "Java" goods
had the same source of origin, the plaintiff possessed a separate and in-
dependent trademark.119 The plaintiff had established its own market
and independent goodwill; thus, the plaintiff had the right to preclude the
importation of the defendant's genuine "Java" goods.12 °
Since the Katzel decision, courts 121 and commentators122 have gen-
erally recognized territoriality as the prevailing principle of trademark
law. 123 Congress recognized that a trademark may have a separate legal
existence in each individual country in which a local trademark owner
has developed independent goodwill. In 1962, Congress enacted an
amendment to Section 32 of the Lanham Act 124 which codified this prin-
ciple. Prior to this amendment, the section required that a plaintiff in a
trademark infringement action show consumer confusion specifically as
to the "source of origin" of the allegedly infringing products. 125 Con-
gress eliminated the "source of origin" language, thereby accepting the
principle of territoriality and recognizing that a trademark serves as
more than an indication of the physical origin of a product. This amend-
ment allows a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action for trademark in-
fringement by showing likelihood of confusion of any sort, not just
likelihood of confusion as to source of origin.12 6
116 Id. at 859.
117 275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1922).
118 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Well, 618 F. Supp. at 713: Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1070; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at
1170.
122 See Derenberg, supra note 103, at 734; Beir, supra note 102, at 58.
123 The principle of territoriality has been accepted in the international realm as well with the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property which authorized territorial assignments
of trademark rights subject to national law. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, March 20, 1883, as revised, art. 6(3), 21 U.S.T. 1583; 24 U.S.T. 2160, T.I.A.S. No. 6923,
7727, where it is stated that "a mark duly registered in a country of this Union shall be registered as
independent of marks registered in other countries of the Union including the country of origin."
124 See 15 U.S.C § 1114(1)(a)supra note 94.
125 See Well, 618 F. Supp. at 706.
126 Id. See also Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1071. Congress evidently wished to make it clear
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Courts have generally continued to apply the territoriality principle
to grey market import cases."t 7 The application of this principle to such
cases has allowed courts to prohibit the importation of genuine goods by
recognizing that such goods may indeed cause consumer confusion and
thereby constitute trademark infringement.1 28 One of the most recent
cases in which a court has applied the territoriality principle to a grey
market situation is Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash. E9 In this case,
the plaintiff was in the business of importing and distributing in the
United States fine giftware bearing the trademark "Lladro."' 13 The
Spanish manufacturer of these goods designated the plaintiff as the exclu-
sive United States distributor of "Lladro" porcelain and granted the
plaintiff the right to obtain a United States trademark for the "Lladro"
mark in the plaintiff's name. 131 Some years later, the defendants began
importing and selling in the United States genuine "Lladro" porcelain
products which they had acquired from the Spanish manufacturer.
The court applied the territoriality principle as formulated in Katzel
and rejected the defendants' contention that the public would not be
deceived as to the goods' source of origin because they were genuine.
132
The court stated that the better view was that genuine goods could cause
public confusion when the domestic markholder had developed a sepa-
rate and independent goodwill for the product, even if the source of ori-
gin of the plaintiff's and defendants' products was the same.
33
Similarly, the court in Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo ' 34 applied the
principle of terrritoriality. The court first observed that the older univer-
sality principle was seriously flawed.' 35 Not only did the principle fail to
recognize that legal rights within one country were created by that coun-
try's laws, but the principle failed to acknowledge that, within one coun-
that the use of trademarks which are likely to cause confusion or mistake of any kind even as to the
identity of the person or entity which ensures the quality of the goods in the United States would be
actionable under § 32. Syntax Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmaceutical Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568
(2d Cir. 1971); Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1071; Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 706. Yet, even before
Congress amended § 32, the term "source of origin" denoted the "party responsible for exercising
judgment respecting the quality of goods it distributes" and not necessarily the manufacturer. Bell
& Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1070. Thus, Congress' action was undertaken simply to clarify this matter
in order to avoid too narrow an interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1071; Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 706.
127 See, e.g., Well, 618 F. Supp. 700; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1163.
128 Id.
129 618 F. Supp. 700.
130 Id. at 702.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 706.
134 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
135 Id. at 1172.
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try, a trademark may represent a factually different goodwill from that
which the mark may signify elsewhere.13 6 To illustrate, the court posited
a hypothetical in which a manufacturer in Japan made and sold a high-
quality computer under its particular trademark. The product under this
trademark had a good reputation in Japan and in several other countries
where it was distributed and serviced under similarly high standards.
137
The court posited further that the United States distributor and trade-
mark owner failed to maintain high standards by distributing damaged
equipment and failing to provide essential services to the United States
consumer. 138 The court concluded that, in the United States, the mark
would have an entirely different meaning and value than it would else-
where since the trademark not only identified the manufacturer, but the
goodwill (or bad will in this instance) of the United States trademark
owner. 139
The court elaborated further on the point that a trademark may
have a different meaning in each country in which the local trademark
owner has developed independent goodwill. The court described a
scenario in which the United States trademark holder provided quality
equipment and services, thereby earning an excellent reputation in the
United States."14 This reputation could be seriously injured, however, by
importers of the trademarked product who did not provide the same
quality equipment and services. 141 Thus, if the United States mark
owner were not able to prevent such importation, the goodwill and repu-
tation developed in the United States would be severely damaged. 142
The court concluded that an infringement action may lie against im-
porters of goods genuinely marked abroad. 143 In the Osawa case, after
the plaintiff fulfilled its burden of showing an independent and separate
goodwill and a likelihood of consumer confusion, the court granted the
plaintiff a preliminary injunction preventing others from independently




138 Id. at 1172-73.








3. Can Genuine Goods cause Confusion under the
Territoriality Principle?
Prior to Well and Osawa, courts in other grey market cases wrote
opinions which could be construed as rejecting the territoriality principle
and, thereby, implicitly accepting the principle of universality.'45 In at-
tempting to cut through the current issue confusion, the court in Weil
described the present legal atmosphere as one in which the courts are
split as to whether the territoriality principle operates so as to permit a
finding that the importation of genuine goods may cause confusion and
thus be deemed an infringement of trademark rights. 146 This Comment
asserts that, upon closer examination, the courts may not be split on the
application of the territoriality principle as stated in Weil.'47 Conse-
quently, such decisions should not be considered as persuasive for the
proposition that genuine goods cannot cause confusion so as to be
deemed infringing.
a. The Monte Carlo and El Greco decisions
The first set of cases cited in Weil as rejecting the proposition that
genuine goods may cause consumer confusion includes Monte Carlo
Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo International (America) Corp. 148 and El Greco
Leather Products Co., Inc. v. Shoe World, Inc. 149 In both cases the courts
held that, when faced with the importation of genuine products from
abroad, a plaintiff domestic trademark owner did not have a cause of
action for trademark infringement.
In Monte Carlo, the plaintiff sold and distributed in the United
States shirts which it procured from a Korean shirt manufacturer.150 In
this particular instance, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to
purchase mens' shirts to be manufactured to the plaintiff's specifications
and bearing the plaintiff's label.' After the Korean manufacturer com-
pleted the shirts and shipped them to the United States, the plaintiff re-
fused to accept them because certain documents needed to clear the
shipment at customs failed to arrive in time for Christmas sales.' 52 A
United States subsidiary of the Korean manufacturer subsequently
145 See Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d 1354; El Greco, 599 F. Supp. 1380; DEP, 622 F.2d 621; Bell &
Howell, 719 F.2d 1054.
146 618 F. Supp. at 706.
147 See infra notes 148-89 and accompanying text.
148 707 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1982).
149 599 F. Supp. 1380.
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purchased the shirts from the manufacturer and sold them without the
plaintiff's permission to discount retailers with the plaintiff's labels and
packaging still intact.
15 3
The court in Monte Carlo held that the case did not present an in-
stance of trademark infringement. 54 The court emphasized that it was
treating the issue as a very narrow one, concerning itself only with the
question of "whether the unauthorized sale of a genuine, unaltered prod-
uct initially manufactured for the plaintiff can form the subject of a
trademark claim."' 55 The court stated that the goods were "the genuine
products, planned and sponsored by the plaintiff shirt company and pro-
duced for it on contract for future sale."' 56 The court distinguished the
situation in Monte Carlo from that in Katzel, stating that Katzel "did not
involve plaintiff's genuine goods but rather goods produced by the owner
of the plaintiff's trademark in a foreign country."' 57 The court empha-
sized that, in Katzel, there may have been harm to the plaintiff from the
inability to control the quality of the foreign producer's goods, but in
Monte Carlo the goods were, in fact, ordered and sponsored by the
plaintiff. '58
Similarly, in El Greco, the court concluded that the unauthorized
importation and sale of genuine goods did not constitute trademark in-
fringement. 59 In this case, the plaintiff, the owner of the United States
trademark "Candies," engaged foreign manufacturers to make shoes
under the "Candies" trademark. 6 ° On one occassion the plaintiff re-
jected the shipment of shoes having a certain style number because the
shipment was late. Subsequently, the defendant purchased the shoes
from the Brazilian manufacturer and sold them in the United States.
16 1
The court in El Greco cited the Monte Carlo decision with approval,
stating that the shoes in the El Greco case, like the shirts in Monte Carlo,
originally were planned and sponsored by the plaintiff.' 62 Moreover, the
court noted that, as with the shirt orders in Monte Carlo, the plaintiff in
El Greco did not cancel the shoe orders because of substandard manufac-
ture or poor quality, but merely because the goods arrived late.' 63 As
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1358.
155 Id. at 1357 n.3.
156 Id. at 1358.
157 Id. at 1357 n.3.
158 Id.
159 599 F. Supp. at 1394.
160 Id. at 1384.
161 Id.




these products were genuine goods originally ordered by the plaintiff and
ultimately produced without defect, the court concluded that there could
be no public confusion and, therefore, no trademark infringement.1"4
The courts in Monte Carlo and El Greco both concluded that the
importation of genuine goods cannot cause the confusion necessary to
constitute trademark infringement.16 Taken out of context, such a con-
clusion could be interpreted as rejecting the territoriality principle and
thus precluding a finding that genuine goods can cause confusion and
thereby infringe the rights of a domestic trademark owner.
However, the findings of these two courts must be considered within
the context of the peculiar facts in each case. Both Monte Carlo and El
Greco involved goods specifically ordered and approved by the plaintiff
domestic markholder. In addition, these goods apparently were manu-
factured to the satisfaction of the domestic markholder, the rejection of
the goods being based only on late delivery. Thus, when the courts used
the term "genuine goods" in these cases, they used it in its narrowest
sense. The courts defined the term as it related to goods manufactured at
the request and with the sponsorship of the plaintiff and, at some point in
time, designated those goods as belonging to the plaintiff. This definition
is much narrower than the definition generally given to that term. In
most circumstances, "genuine goods" refers to all goods which are pro-
duced in a foreign country and which bear a trademark identical to that
of the plaintiff domestic mark owner regardless of whether the goods
were manufactured or designated especially for the plaintiff.166
That the definition of "genuine goods" used by the courts in these
cases is narrower than the definition generally employed is evidenced by
the court in Monte Carlo describing Katzel as a case not involving "genu-
ine goods."16 7 The court in Katzel, however, considered the goods to be
genuine. 168 Moreover, the goods in Katzel have continued to be charac-
terized as genuine by subsequent courts 169 and commentators 170 inter-
164 Id. at 1394.
165 See Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d at 1058; El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1394.
166 See Katzel, 260 U.S. 689; Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. 1063; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1164; Weil,
618 F. Supp. 700. See also Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is
Not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707, 713 (1959)(defining genuine goods as those
goods which bear marks signifying the same source of origin as that which the mark normally repre-
sents to the public).
167 Id. at 1057 n.3.
168 See Katzel, 260 U.S. 689.
169 See, eg., Weil, 618 F. Supp. 700; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. 1164; Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp.
1063.
170 See ag., R. CALLMAN, supra note 105, § 21.17; Bier, supra note 102, at 48.
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preting the case, despite the fact that the goods were not manufactured
specifically for the plaintiff.
Consequently, these two cases do not necessarily reject the proposi-
tion that "genuine goods," as the term is typically defined, can cause
confusion. Rather, Monte Carlo and El Greco can be viewed as cases
which merely redefine the term "genuine goods" to encompass a nar-
rower and more limited group of goods. Monte Carlo and El Greco
should not be viewed as rejecting the well-established territoriality princi-
ple in all cases involving genuine goods. The cases are properly inter-
preted as the refusal of two courts to extend the principle to particular
situations in which goods are manufactured specifically for the plaintiffs.
This interpretation of "genuine goods" constitutes a rather small subset
of those types of goods Which generally have been understood to be genu-
ine goods.
1 71
b. The DEP and Bell & Howell decisions
Two other cases cited in Weil t72 as expressing skepticism that genu-
ine goods can cause confusion under the territoriality principle are DEP
Corp. v. Interstate Cigar, Co. '73 and Bell & Howell.'74 In DEP, the plain-
tiff obtained from a British corporation holding worldwide distribution
rights to "Pears" soap, the exclusive right to distribute "Pears" products
in the United States.' 75 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's com-
plaint on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue since it was
not the owner of the trademark. 176 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decision dismissing the case, but stated in dictum 177 that
it appeared anomalous for an infringement action to lie where the goods
involved were genuine and not spurious.
178
In Bell & Howell, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit va-
cated an injunction granted in favor of the plaintiff by the district
171 It may be argued, however, that "genuine goods" even defined narrowly as in Monte Carlo
and El Greco may nevertheless cause confusion according to the territoriality principle. Further-
more, one could assert that one of the reasons for the application of the territoriality principle; i.e.,
one of protection of the domestic markholder's goodwill from a third-party importer's failure to
provide the necessary warranties and servicing for the product, is present in the Monte Carlo and El
Greco cases as well.
172 618 F. Supp. at 706.
173 622 F.2d 621.
174 719 F.2d 42.
175 See DEP, 622 F.2d at 622.
176 Id.
177 When confronted with the argument made by the plaintiff that, according to Katzel, an in-
fringement action may be brought against an importer of genuine goods, the court specifically stated




court.179 The district court found that the plaintiff had established good-
will separate from that of the original manufacturer and that the defend-
ant's importation and sale of goods bearing the identical trademark was
likely to cause consumer confusion.' 80 Based upon these findings and
relying on the principle of territoriality as expressed in Katzel, the district
court issued a preliminary injunction"' against the defendant.
The Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the preliminary injunction
because the plaintiff did not make a showing of irreparable harm as re-
quired for the issuance of an injunction.182 The court stated that:
irreparable injury may well not be present herein since there would be little
confusion, if any, as to the origin of the goods and no significant likelihood
of damage to [the plaintiff's] reputation since thus far it has not been shown
that [the defendant's] goods which have a common origin of manufacture
with [the plaintiff's] goods are inferior to those sold by [the plaintiff] and
injuring [the plaintiff's] reputation.'
83
Although DEP and Bell & Howell are cited in Wel as "cases which
have concluded that genuine goods cannot cause confusion,"'8 4 it may be
argued that these two decisions do not fit such an interpretation. First,
while it must be conceded that the DEP court expressed skepticism as to
the validity of an infringement action brought against a third-party im-
porter and seller of genuine goods, the statement quoted above from the
Bell & Howell court should not be construed as expressing such skepti-
cism. The court in Bell & Howell stated that there was no showing of
irreparable injury because, among other things, there was little confusion
as to the origin of the goods. The court used the word "origin" in its
narrowest sense: the place of manufacture. This interpretation becomes
apparent when, later in the same paragraph, the court describes the
goods imported by both the plaintiff and defendant as having "a common
origin of manufacture."' 85 By recognizing that there was no confusion as
to the place of manufacture, the court was not necessarily stating that
confusion could not possibly exist as to the person standing behind or
179 719 F.2d at 46.
180 548 F. Supp. at 1079.
181 In order for a preliminary injunction to be granted in this case, the party seeking the injunc-
tion needed to "make a showing of (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on
the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for
litigation and a balance of the hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting preliminary
relief." Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 45 (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596
F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)).
182 Id. at 46.
183 Id.
184 618 F. Supp. at 706.
185 Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 46.
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sponsoring the product in the United States. 186 Furthermore, the court
recognized that such confusion could exist when it stated that a possible
remedy for any confusion resulting from the parties' warranty differences
would be to label the defendant's goods as lacking all such warranties.
187
In sum, the court did not say, as the Well court apparently inter-
preted it, that confusion in cases involving genuine goods could not exist.
Instead, the court in Bell & Howell was merely stating that a showing of
confusion sufficient to establish irreparable harm had not been made be-
cause the genuine goods sold by the defendant were not inferior to the
plaintiff's goods and the sale of the goods by the defendant did not harm
the plaintiff's established reputation. Absent a showing of such harm,
the court could not issue an injunction against further importation of the
defendant's goods.
Furthermore, even though the court in DEP explicitly questioned
the proposition that a trademark infringement action could lie against an
importer and seller of genuine goods, and even if the Bell & Howell deci-
sion can be construed as expressing similar skepticism, the statements in
these cases which have been interpreted as expressing such doubt are
undeniably dicta. The courts reached the explicit conclusion in DEP and
the arguably implicit conclusion in Bell & Howell without any analysis,
by either court, of the relevant underlying and controlling principles of
trademark law. Indeed, both courts made it quite clear that they were
not addressing the substantive legal issues presented in each case."8'
The court in Weil interprets these cases as concluding that genuine
goods can never cause confusion. Indeed, the Weil court states that these
cases rely implicitly "on a principle of trademark law which has long
since [Katzel] been rejected" and are "based on a simplistic interpretation
of the confusion requirement which cannot be squared with the Act."'
189
Neither DEP nor the Bell & Howell case reached the conclusion that
genuine goods cannot cause confusion nor did either adopt an interpreta-
tion of the confusion requirement. Thus, while the court in Weil seems
somewhat concerned with the presence of these cases, neither of the deci-
sions should cause a court to question the validity of the territoriality
principle ard its underlying proposition that genuine goods can be held
likely to cause confusion to the public.
The application of the territoriality principle does not necessarily
186 Id. See also R. CALLMAN, supra note 105, § 21.07, for a general discussion about consumer
confusion as to origin and sponsorship.
187 Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 46.
188 Id.; see also DEP, 622 F.2d at 622 n.1.
189 Weil, 618 F. Supp. at 706.
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result in a finding of confusion. The existence of "likelihood of confu-
sion" involves a separate determination. This principle merely allows a
court to make such a determination. Given that the principle of territori-
ality is the prevailing view of trademark law, a court should not be wary
of applying the principle to genuine goods cases even though other deci-
sions have been read as casting doubt upon the principle's applicability.
While the application of this principle does not solve the problems posed
by the importation of genuine goods, 19° it allows a court deciding a grey
market case to begin its analysis on familiar footing, using traditional
trademark principles as a guide.
III. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to review the alternative courses of
action available to a United States trademark owner confronted with the
importation of genuine goods manufactured abroad. In so doing, the
Comment has discussed the many obstacles faced by a United States
trademark owner in trying to prohibit the importation of grey market
goods. The Comment has also noted the difficulties faced by the United
States Customs Service in implementing the statute dealing with the im-
portation of genuine goods as well as the courts in applying traditional
trademark law in private actions brought against importers of these
goods.
Some of the problems identified in this Comment could be solved by
reading § 526 literally, thereby prohibiting the importation of all grey
market goods absent the consent of the domestic trademark owner.
However, with the courts split on this issue, many domestic trademark
owners will be required to seek relief in private actions in district courts.
Often involving traditional trademark law and analysis, these cases pose
special problems for both the domestic trademark holder and the courts.
These problems will become more serious unless courts pay the utmost
attention to the mandates of traditional trademark principles and make
careful application of these principles to the wide factual variations
which the courts will be certain to encounter in these cases.
Barbara A. Curry
190 See Bier, supra note 102, at 61.
